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A location in space or spatial location will here be not a point in space, but 
what is produced by enclosing a (in three dimensions positively extended) 
part of space in an outward boundary (the boundary, too, is to belong to the 
location). A location in time or temporal location will here be not a point 
in time, but a closed interval in time (the boundary-points, too, are to be-
long to the location). L, L´, L´´, … will be used to designate locations in 
space; T, T´, T´´, … will be used to designate locations in time; t, t´, t´´, … 
will be used to designate points in time; l, l´, l´´, … will be used to desig-
nate points in space; X, X´, X´´, … will be used to designate objects of any 
kind (including temporal and spatial locations, points in time and points in 
space). The word “object” is not used as a synonym for “entity” here. 
Rather, it designates any individual-like entity that is necessarily of finite 
extension in all the dimensions it may happen to have. 
Spatial locations are special sets of points in space, temporal locations 
special sets of points in time. Accordingly, “t is in T,” “l is in L” simply 
means that t is an element of T, that l is an element of L. Note that, presup-
posing the continuity of space and time, every spatial location is an infinite 
set of points in space, and every temporal location an infinite set of points 
in time. 
The fundamental localization-predicate for space is “X is at t in L”; the 
fundamental localization-predicate for time is “X is in T”. We will also be 
using the fundamental mereological predicates “X´ is at t a spatial part of 
X,” “X´ is a temporal part of X,” and “X´ is a part of X.” 
 
2. Two fundamental principles 
 
P1   For all X, t, and L: X is at t in L ≡ some X´ is at t a spatial part of X, 
and every spatial part of X at t is at t in L. 
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P2   For all X and T: X is in T ≡ some X´ is a temporal part of X, and every 
temporal part of X is in T. 
 
3. Two consequences of these principles 
 
C1   For all X and t: X has no spatial part at t ⊃ X is in no spatial location 
at t. 
 
C2   For all X: X has no temporal part ⊃ X is in no temporal location. 
 
Note that an object’s being in no spatial location does not preclude that a 
spatial location can be analogically associated with the object. Likewise, 
an object’s being in no temporal location does not preclude that a temporal 
location can be analogically associated with it. Important examples will be 
presented below. 
 
4. The definitions of exact localization and exact location 
 
D1   X is at t exactly in L := X is at t in L, and there is no part L´ of L 
which is such that there is at t no spatial part X´ of X with X´ being at t in 
L´. 
 
D2   L is the spatial location of X at t := X is at t exactly in L. 
 
D3   X is exactly in T := X is in T, and there is no part T´ of T which is 
such that there is no temporal part X´ of X with X´ being in T´. 
 
D4   T is the temporal location of X := X is exactly in T. 
 
5. Two questions, leading to further questions 
 
If X is at t in L, does is follow that there is a spatial location L´ such that X 
is at t exactly in L´? If X is in T, does it follow that there is a temporal 
location T´ such that X is exactly in T´? The answer to the second question 
is “No.” Suppose X is an object with temporal parts and with an 
intermittent existence: first it exists for a while, then it does not exist for a 
while, then again it exists for a while. Then there is nevertheless a temporal 
location T such that X is in T, but obviously there cannot be a temporal lo-
cation T´ such that X is exactly in T´. (Remember that T´, as a temporal 
location, must be a closed interval in time.) Taking the idea from the 
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must be a closed interval in time.) Taking the idea from the temporal coun-
terexample, it is easily seen that one cannot conclude from X being in L at 
t that X is at t exactly in any spatial location L´. 
While being in some spatial location will often be (we may take it) 
without being exactly in any spatial location, it would (come to think of it) 
be a very strange universe indeed if being in some spatial location were in 
each and every case, of a point in time t and an object X that is not itself a 
spatial location, without being exactly in any spatial location. X is at t a 
spatially full object if, and only if, there is some spatial location in which, 
at t, X exactly is. Trivially, every spatial location is a spatially full object at 
any point in time. But is any object ever spatially full that is not itself a 
spatial location? Yes, a finite part of a gravitational field seems to be an 
example. But, so far, spatially full material objects have never been ob-
served. Indeed, spatially full material objects seem to be impossible, since 
it seems such objects would have to be of infinite density (and therefore of 
infinite mass). But if there is no material object that is ever spatially full 
(which entails that there are no Democritean atoms), what, then, is the na-
ture of the composition of material objects? If one delves into this ques-
tion, all initial clarity quickly disappears. Thus, what many still consider to 
be the most lucid – least obscure – kind of entity, material object, is by no 
means as lucid as it seems at first sight to be. 
 
6. Definitions concerning physical objects 
 
D5   X is a physical object := it is (metaphysically) possible that there is a 
point in time, t, and a spatial location, L, such that X is at t in L. 
 
Since metaphysical possibility is an S5-modality – which implies that the 
principle what is possible is necessarily possible is valid for it – D5 entails 
that every physical object is a physical object with metaphysical necessity. 
 
The relevant logical structure here is not the trivial □(A ⊃ A), but rather this: (A ⊃ 
□A). 
 
Note also that being a physical object does not entail being purely a physi-
cal object. This remains true if “physical” (in “physical object”) is aug-
mented as follows: “at t existing physical,” “existent physical,” “persistent 
physical,” “enduring physical,” “perduring physical” (concerning these 
augmentations of “physical,” see below). However, while it is true that 
 94
every physical object is a physical object with metaphysical necessity, it is 
not true that every at t existing physical object is an at t existing physical 
object with metaphysical necessity. And what results if “at t existing” is, in 
the previous sentence, replaced by “existent” is also not true. The simple 
reason for this is that there are certainly at t existing – respectively, (sim-
pliciter) existent – physical objects for which it is not metaphysically nec-
essary that they exist at t – respectively, that they are existent. 
 
D6   X is at t an existing physical object := there is a spatial location, L, 
such that X is at t in L. 
 
D7   X is an existent physical object := there is a point in time, t, such that 
X is at t an existing physical object. 
 
D8   X is a persistent physical object := there is a location in time, T, such 
that for every t in T there is a spatial location L such that X is at t in L. 
 
Note that even though it seems certain that there are existent physical ob-
jects, it does not automatically follow that there are also persistent physical 
objects. 
 
D9   X is an enduring physical object := X is a persistent physical object, 
and there is no X´ such that X´ is a temporal part of X. 
 
D10   X is a perduring physical object := X is a persistent physical object, 
and there is an X´ such that X´ is a temporal part of X. 
 
7. An ontological classification 
 
(I) Objects that do not have, at any point in time, any spatial part and 
that do not have any temporal part. 
(II) Objects that have some temporal part, but do not have, at any 
point in time, any spatial part. 
(III) Objects that have, at some point in time, some spatial part, but do 
not have any temporal part. 
(IV) Objects that have, at some point in time, some spatial part, and 
that also have some temporal part. 
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For purely logical reasons, no object can be subsumed under two of the 
above four headings, and for purely logical reasons, every object must be 
subsumed under one of the four headings. It is a curious fact of the history 
of metaphysics that most modern metaphysicians are more or less eager to 
argue that there is in fact no object that falls under the headings (I), (II), 
and (III). The opposition to (I)-objects is very old, the opposition to (II)-
objects more recent; the most recent opposition is the opposition to (III)-
objects. 
Before discussing each of the above four categories of objects, we as-
sume the following two additional, highly plausible principles: 
 
P3   For all X and t: X has at t some spatial part ⊃ there is some L such that 
X is at t in L. 
 
P4   For all X: X has some temporal part ⊃ there is some T such that X is 
in T. 
 
These principles, taken together with C1 and C2, have the following logi-
cal consequences: 
 
C3   For all X and t: X has at t some spatial part ≡ X is at t in some spatial 
location. 
 
The left-to-right part of the biconditional C3 is just P3. The right-to-left part of the 
biconditional C3 is the contraposition of C1 (which itself is logical consequence of 
P1). 
 
C4   For all X: X has some temporal part ≡ X is in some temporal location. 
 
The left-to-right part of the biconditional C4 is just P4. The right-to-left part of the 
biconditional C4 is the contraposition of C2 (which is itself a logical consequence of 
P2). 
 
Now, concerning (I)-objects: According to C3 and C4, the objects that do 
not have, at any point in time, any spatial part and that do not have any 
temporal part are precisely the objects that are in no temporal location and 
never in any spatial location. In other words, (I)-objects are outside of time 
and space. Putative examples of such objects are not only numbers and 
other type-objects (i.e., non-predicative universals), like the lion and the 
homo sapiens, but also non-physical substances, like human souls. Though 
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(I)-objects are outside of space, a spatial location can be analogically asso-
ciated with (I)-objects if they are exemplified by objects that are, literally, 
in a spatial location. If an exemplum X´ of a (I)-object X is at t in L, then 
X, too, can be said – analogically – to be at t in L. Thus, the type-object 
homo sapiens is at t in any spatial location in which there is at t a human 
being. The analogical being-in a spatial location is quite different from the 
literal being-in a spatial location, since, obviously, homo sapiens is at one 
and the same point in time analogically-in separated spatial locations – 
while no human being can be literally-in separated spatial locations at one 
and the same point in time. 
Exemplification is not the only way to locate (I)-objects analogically in 
space. Spatial locations can also be analogically associated with, say, hu-
man souls, which are (I)-objects of a quite different sort than type-objects 
(the latter being individual-like universals, whereas souls are true individu-
als), via the living human bodies to which these souls are connected: a soul 
is at t (analogically) in every spatial location in which its body is at t (liter-
ally). It should not go unmentioned that temporal locations, too, can easily 
be analogically associated with souls: Consider the non-empty set of points 
in time at which a given soul (of a body) is connected to its body. Every 
temporal location that includes this set is a temporal location in which that 
soul is (analogically speaking, not literally). 
 
Concerning (II)-objects: According to C3 and C4, (II)-objects are outside 
of space, but in time. The putative examples of (II)-objects that immedi-
ately come to mind are conscious mental occurrences, (conscious) experi-
ences in the broadest sense. But in these times of the predominance of ma-
terialism, one is constrained to offer further specifications: experiences as 
they are traditionally conceived of, i.e., experiences as they are conceived 
of by psychophysical dualists, or by idealists. It goes without saying that 
experiences thus conceived of are nowadays almost as much out of favor as 
souls are (and as universals would still be, I dare say, if the authoritative 
materialist David Armstrong had not had pity on them). 
 
Concerning (III)-objects: According to C3, D6, and D7, all (III)-objects are 
existent physical objects. This may make it seem easy to find examples of 
(III)-objects that are not only putative examples of them. Unfortunately, 
according to C3 and C4, (III)-objects are not only in space, but also outside 
of time, which for many metaphysicians makes them very dubious entities 
indeed. Their being outside of time can easily be eclipsed, since a temporal 
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location can very naturally be analogically associated with any (III)-
object: Take the non-empty set of all points in time at which a given (III)-
object exists, in short: its duration; a (III)-object is analogically in every 
temporal location that includes its duration. But literally – because of its 
lack of temporal parts – it is in no temporal location. 
Frequently, the absence of a (literal) temporal location for (III)-objects 
is expressed in the following highly suggestive, but somewhat misleading 
way: (III)-objects are said to be “wholly present at each point in time at 
which they exist.” The same can be said of (I)-objects: they, too, are 
“wholly present at each point in time at which they exist.” The formulation 
is somewhat misleading since, contrary to its real intention, it suggests that 
(III)-objects and (I)-objects are (literally) in time, albeit in a strange way. 
Despite their recent dubiousness to many metaphysicians, (III)-objects 
constitute, in the history of ideas, the standard conception of existent 
physical objects. Note that so-called Aristotelian material continuants are 
(III)-objects. Note also that one could define (III)-objects as existent physi-
cal objects that have no temporal parts. 
 
Above, (III)-objects have been defined as “objects that have, at some point in time, 
some spatial part, but do not have any temporal part.” But the first part of that defini-
tion – “objects that have, at some point in time, some spatial part” – is synonymous to 
“existent physical objects,” according to D6 and D7. 
 
Concerning (IV)-objects: According to C3 and C4, (IV)-objects are both in 
space and in time. According to D6 and D7, they are the existent physical 
objects that have some temporal part. For most modern metaphysicians, 
the spatio-temporal double locatedness of (IV)-objects is a mark of onto-
logical distinction that confers to them, so to speak, the right of there-being 
– given that those metaphysicians tend to deny this right to the three other 
categories of objects in the above fourfold classification. Direct examples 
of (IV)-objects are physical occurrences, goings-on in time and space; in 
fact, physical occurrences do seem to exhaust the (IV)-objects. 
 
8. Reductionism and eliminativism regarding objects other than (IV)-
objects 
 
If one believes, as modern metaphysicians tend to believe, that there just 
aren’t any other objects than physical occurrences, one still has a choice 
with respect to objects other than physical occurrences: either one thinks it 
worthwhile to try to model, on the basis of (IV)-objects, at least some of 
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those objects that one considers to be, in fact, non-entities (i.e., the (I)-
objects, (II)-objects, and (III)-objects), or one does not think it worthwhile. 
Usually, the first alternative has seemed much more attractive than the 
second (and this bespeaks the considerable intuitive force which is retained 
by the assumption that there are other objects than physical occurrences 
even after this assumption has been discarded). 
Adopting the first alternative with regard to (I)-objects, has led to re-
construction-theories for abstract objects. With regard to (I)-objects, how-
ever, that are not abstract objects – like souls, God, and non-existent physi-
cal objects –, one has, as a rule, not gone to so much trouble; simple denial 
has usually been thought good enough for them. 
 
Non-existent physical objects are (I)-objects? – Yes, they are. According to D6 and 
D7, a non-existent physical object is a physical object such that there is no point in 
time, t, such that there is a spatial location, L, such that X is at t in L. In short, a non-
existent physical object never is in a spatial location; it is, therefore, not in space. But 
if a physical object is not in space, it is not in time either, because if it never is in a 
spatial location, it does not exist at any point in time – according to D6 – and hence 
cannot be in a temporal location, since the following statement certainly is a true gen-
eral principle: 
 
P5   For all X and T: X is in T ⊃ there is a t in T at which X exists. 
 
Thus, non-existent physical objects are indeed (I)-objects. 
 
The said reconstruction-theories for abstract object have not been entirely 
successful, since one is forced to postulate (besides (IV)-objects) certain 
non-reconstructed, hence non-reduced, abstract objects – for example, sets 
– as forming the basis for the reconstructions. It’s not only true: de nihilo 
nihil, it’s also true: de nihilo abstracto nihil abstractum. 
Adopting, in turn, the above first alternative with regard to (II)-objects, 
has led to physicalist reductionism in the philosophy of mind, one of its 
manifestations being the notorious token-identity theory. Finally, to adopt 
the said alternative also with regard to (III)-objects may seem an easy 
thing to do, because to all putative (III)-objects there correspond one-to-
one certain (IV)-objects, certain physical occurrences: Clearly, each puta-
tive (III)-object has exactly one course of existence, and different putative 
(III)-objects have different courses of existence; and if X is a putative (III)-
object, then its course of existence is no doubt a physical occurrence. 
Therefore, why not simply replace the putative (III)-objects – while retain-
ing their names – by their courses of existence, which are (IV)-objects? 
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Here is a reason why not: It might have been otherwise with a putative 
(III)-object than it is in fact; for example, this stone might now have lain 
over there instead of over here. It seems that there is no way of reconstruct-
ing this way of speaking truly about this stone if this stone is no longer re-
garded as a certain (III)-object but as a course of existence (namely, the 
initially assumed (III)-object’s course of existence); for if the stone had 
lain over there, its course of existence would have been a course of exis-
tence that is numerically different from its actual course of existence, while 
the stone itself, even if it had lain over there, would still be numerically 
identical to the stone that actually lies over here. 
But, in fact, there is a way of reconstructing the above true assertion of 
a specific counterfactual possibility within a – broadened – (IV)-object on-
tology. It is another question, however, whether that way of reconstruction 
is plausible. Suppose this stone is identified with a certain physical occur-
rence. Then we can say some things truly about the stone that we could not 
say formerly, when we still regarded the stone as a (III)-object; for exam-
ple, that an earlier stage of this stone lay over there. That’s not a bad thing. 
But we would certainly also like to still say some things truly about the 
stone that we could already say truly about it formerly, when we still re-
garded the stone as a (III)-object; one of these things is that this stone 
might now have lain over there instead of over here. Now, one who is in-
spired by David Lewis will argue that asserting that this stone (qua (IV)-
object, qua physical occurrence) might now have lain over there instead of 
over here amounts to asserting that, while this stone is now actually lying 
over here, there is a counterpart of it, X, that now lies over there and not 
over here – but of course not in the actual word but in some other, non-
actual possible world. This counterpart, X, of the stone is, indeed, a non-
existent physical object. Hence (see above in this section) it is neither in 
space nor in time (in other words, it does not have, at any point in time, 
any spatial part, and it does not have any temporal part, either), which, 
however, does not prevent it (1) from being (simpliciter) a physical object 
(see D5), and (2) from being a (IV)-object in another possible world – that 
is, an in another possible world existent physical object that has some tem-
poral part (compare the end of the previous section), in other words: a 
physical occurrence in another possible world. 
The Lewis-inspired proposal just described should not be criticized, in 
my eyes (others will think otherwise), on account of relying on non-
existent objects (or non-actual objects, if you prefer; Lewis, in fact, would 
have very much preferred the latter verbalization, since he did not believe 
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that existence and actuality could be legitimately identified). It also should 
not be criticized on account of introducing a notion of existence which is 
relative in what may seem to be a weird way: existence in a possible 
world. The real problem with this proposal is that it leaves one with noth-
ing but arbitrary stipulation regarding the question what counts as a coun-
terpart of a given (IV)-object in another possible world, once unreduced 
reference to (III)-objects is forbidden (and such reference must be forbid-
den if all putative (III)-objects are to be reducible to (IV)-objects). If one 
does accept (III)-objects, then the counterpart-relation need not be an arbi-
trary concoction even when it straddles possible worlds: the possible 
course of existence X´1 of the (III)-object X1 is a counterpart of the possi-
ble course of existence X´2 of the (III)-object X2 if, and only if, X1 = X2. 
This is certainly a non-arbitrary definition of X´1 being a counterpart of X´2 
(one that makes the counterpart-relation an equivalence relation if that rela-
tion holds precisely between the possible courses of existence and if each 
such course is the possible course of existence of some (III)-object). But if 
one does not accept (III)-objects, what will then be the necessary and suffi-
cient condition for X´1 being a counterpart of X´2? 
As is well known, Lewis relied on overall-similarity to define the coun-
terpart-relation: a counterpart X´ of a (IV)-object X is maximally overall-
similar to X among all the (IV)-objects in X´’s world (in the space-time to 
which X´ belongs). But like love, similarity is a fickle thing, and like 
beauty, it is in the eye of the beholder. Thus, a person may at a time legiti-
mately judge that X´ – a (IV)-object in another possible world – is a coun-
terpart of X, and just as legitimately at another time that it is not (having 
shifted her emphasis from certain similarity-aspects to others); and one 
person may at a time legitimately judge that X´ is a counterpart of X, but 
another person at the same time just as legitimately that it is not. This is 
certainly not an ontologically satisfactory situation. 
 
9. The strangeness of ontological denial 
 
A classification of objects is easily made. Some object-classifications are 
uninteresting; others are interesting. I submit that the above classification 
of objects into (I)-objects, (II)-objects, (III)-objects and (IV)-objects is a 
rather interesting classification. The intriguing thing is that the ingredients 
of that classification – (1) having some temporal part and the negation of 
this: not having any temporal part, and (2) having, at some point in time, 
some spatial part and the negation of this: not having, at any point in time, 
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any spatial part – seem harmless enough, in themselves and in relation to 
each other. There seems to be no a priori reason why any of the four cate-
gories that can be formed by consistently combining the said classification-
ingredients should be empty. Why, then, is it nevertheless assumed by so 
many that three of the categories are in fact empty? That seems strange. Do 
they have straight empirical reasons for this assumption? Most certainly 
not; for the questions whether there are (I)-objects, (II)-objects, (III)-
objects, (IV)-objects are quite far removed from, say, the questions 
whether there are mammals with neither tail nor beak, mammals with beak 
but without tail, mammals with tail but without beak, mammals with both 
tail and beak. The former questions are, so to speak, on a plane of inquiry 
that is quite different from the plane of inquiry to which the latter questions 
belong. The latter questions are empirical, the former metaphysical. 
The distinction between empirical and metaphysical inquiry does, how-
ever, not imply that metaphysical inquiry is bound to be a priori (to as-
sume that the distinction does imply the apriority of metaphysical inquiry 
would just amount to making all over again the old, Kantian mistake re-
garding the conception of metaphysics, which has been so detrimental to 
the subject). Metaphysical inquiry is not empirical inquiry, but it is never-
theless strongly related to human experience, and therefore certainly not a 
priori. Metaphysical inquiry aims at a basic interpretation of experience; it 
is, so to speak, the basic hermeneutics of experience. 
In this light, what position should one adopt regarding (I)-objects, (II)-
objects, (III)-objects, and (IV)-objects? The answer is quite clear: all four 
kinds of objects have, for a very long time, been objects of reference in that 
interpretation of experience that is manifest in everyday, and also in scien-
tific, human discourse. Contrary to what eliminativists of various stripes 
are wont to claim, it is not likely that this situation will change in any non-
negligible way. The best explanation of this, in turn, is that not only (IV)-
objects but also (I)-objects, (II)-objects and (III)-objects are indeed needed 
for a basic interpretation of experience. Therefore, it is reasonable to as-
sume that there are not only (IV)-objects but also (I)-objects, (II)-objects, 
and (III)-objects; it is reasonable to assume that all four categories of ob-
jects are non-empty, it is not reasonable – or at least less reasonable – to 
assume the contrary. I am well aware that a huge amount of literature has 
been dedicated to arguing the contrary – literature that I cannot even begin 
to do justice to in this short paper –, but it seems to me that all that is 
shown by this remarkable phenomenon is the staggering extent to which 
the ontological community has been ruled by a mentality that is by no 
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means rationally necessary for it to adopt: a mentality which one might 
term the Democritean Ockham’s Razor Mentality. (or in short: Quineian-
ism). It is time for a change. Ontological tolerance is better than ontologi-
cal intolerance, and Ockham’s Razor – Entia non sunt multiplicanda 
praeter necessitatem, no more than an ontological rule of thumb – needs to 
find its partner and correcting principle in Husserl’s Boat (as the following 
quite different ontological rule of thumb may with good reason be 
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